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Abstract 
Many real infrastructure networks, such as power grids and communication networks, are not 
only depend on one another to function, but also embedded in space. A lot of works have been 
devoted to reveal the vulnerability of interdependent spatially embedded networks considers 
random failures. However, recently research show that they are susceptible to geographically 
localized attacks or failures cased by natural disasters or terrorist attacks, which affect all nodes 
within a given radius. In particular, small localized attacks may lead to catastrophic consequences. 
As a remedy of the collapse instability, one research introduced a dynamic healing strategy and the 
possibility of new connectivity link with a probability, called random healing, to bridge two 
remaining neighbors of a failed node. The random strategy is straightforward. Here, unlike 
previous strategy, we propose a simple but effective strategy, called healing strategy by 
prioritizing minimum degree(HPMD), which establishing a new link between two functioning 
neighbors with minimum degree during the cascading failures. In addition, we consider the 
distance between two nodes to avoid change the network structures. Afterwards, a comparison is 
made between HPMD and three healing strategies: random, degree centrality and local centrality 
to identify which a pair of neighbors have high priority. Simulation experiments are presented for 
two square lattices with the same size as interdependent spatially embedded networks under 
localized attacks. Results demonstrated that HPMD strategy has an outstanding performance 
against localized attacks, even when ratio of healing is vary. Moreover, HPMD is more timely, 
more applicability and costless. Our method is meaningful in practice as it can greatly enhance the 
resilience and robustness of interdependent spatially embedded networks against localized attacks, 
and eradicate catastrophic collapse in spatial system. 
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1. Introduction 
It is increasingly clear that almost all real infrastructure networks interact with one another[1]. 
This has led to an emerging new research field in complex networks that is called interdependent 
networks[2]. Those interactions keep systems functional, but increase the vulnerability of 
interdependent networks under random failures or malicious attacks[3]. Because of dependency of 
nodes in interdependent networks, the failures of a small fraction of nodes will cause the 
breakdown of the whole system[4]. Thus, more studies on the robustness of interdependent 
networks have been proposed in Refs[5-8]. However, these studies mainly focus on the 
interdependent networks in which space restrictions are not considers. In fact, many modern 
infrastructure networks are embedded in space, the dependency are restricted by their spatial 
lengths[9]. To model spatial networks, many researchers used 2D lattices[10]. For example, Li et 
al. [11] introduced a model composed of two square lattices interdependent within a certain 
dependency length, called interdependent spatially embedded networks. Along this pioneering 
work, several works have been followed for understanding the vulnerability of interdependent 
spatially embedded networks considers random failures, and found that they are more vulnerable 
than non-embedded networks[12,13]. It is noteworthy that localized attacks on some networks are 
significantly more damaging than random failures[14-17]. 
Localized attacks are geographically attacks induced by natural disasters(e.g. earthquakes) or 
malicious attacks(e.g. burst of atom bomb), i.e., a node is affected, then their neighbors and so 
on[18, 19]. In short, the main difference between localized attacks and random attacks is that the 
former always limited to a local area, while the latter are global attacks and the failures are 
distributed throughout the whole system. Recently research reveals that failures in systems are 
often not random, but geographically localized attacks[20]. Moreover, such localized attacks 
results in an extreme instability of interdependent spatially embedded networks since a small 
failures can trigger an avalanche[21]. Thus, a pressing issue arises as how to enhancing resilience 
of interdependent spatially embedded networks against localized attacks. In the past years, prevent 
and mitigation strategies have been proposed to restrain the cascading of failures in interdependent 
networks[22], including making the number of autonomous nodes with large degree[23,24], 
protecting the node of high degree as critical node[25,26]. Among them, until recently, the 
spontaneous recovery mechanism of single networks[27] and interdependent networks, have 
attracted more attention. Muro et al. [28] showed that recovery mechanism can greatly enhance 
the resilience of interdependent networks, by recovering the mutually boundary nodes during the 
cascading of failures and connecting them to the giant components become active again. The 
recovery strategy in interdependent spatially embedded networks may be suitable to against 
random failures[29], but not for localized attacks. Because this failure type always simultaneously 
destroy multiple adjacent devices, including nodes and their edges. In order to avoid catastrophic 
events, it is necessary to improve the ratio of nodes restored in interdependent spatially embedded 
networks, and is limited by high cost. On the other hand, when localized attacks occurs 
considerable effort is made to reorganize the network among existing nodes by healing[30], i.e., 
bridge some remaining nodes by add new links. 
A rich body of link addition strategies have been proposed both in single network[31] and 
interdependent networks[32-35]. For instance, Stippinger et al.[30] develop a dynamic healing 
model for the competition between the cascading failures and the healing that bridge functioning 
neighbors of failed node by add new connectivity links. Based on healing model, the authors 
propose a simple strategy: randomly chosen two remaining neighbors of a failed node. However, 
there are still some problems to be solved. Firstly, the random strategy test the effects of adding 
new links under random failures, but in the reality, failures may be the results of localized attacks. 
Secondly, different failures types bring different attack effects and need different healing 
strategies[36-39]. To the best of our knowledge, so far there is no research on the healing of 
interdependent spatially embedded networks suffer from localized attacks. In this paper, we 
propose a more effective method, healing strategy by prioritizing minimum degree (henceforth 
labeled as HPMD), which establishing a new link between two functioning neighbors with 
minimum degree of a failed node during the healing process. HPMD is clearly different from 
previous approaches usually take the node of high degree as critical node, and it consider the 
distance between a pair of two neighbors to avoid change the network structures. Applying HPMD 
to simulated networks, we completely show that our strategy is more effective than other healing 
strategies, including random (RH), degree centrality (HPD), and local centrality (HPL), for the 
given ratio of healing , with higher size of mutual giant connected S, higher probability of 
existence of the mutual giant connected P∞, higher critical attack size rhc where the system 
collapses, lower peak of the number of iteration steps(NOI) needed to reach the steady state, fewer 
addition new links during the healing process <Eh> and go on. This opens new avenues of 
research in the study of resilience in embedded spatial systems. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model of interdependent spatially 
embedded networks, and the concept of localized attacks. Section 3 introduces the healing model. 
Section 4 represents the HPMD and Section 5 shows the simulation results and corresponding 
analysis. Section 6 discusses the HPMD. Section 7 summarizes the work. 
2. Network model and failure type 
In this section, we review the interdependent spatially embedded networks model, and briefly 
introduce the concept of localized attacks. 
2.1 interdependent spatially embedded networks 
According to Ref.[14], the interdependent spatially embedded networks have two distinct 
features: (a) each node in network is only connected to the nodes in their spatial vicinity; (b) the 
dependence links between the networks are not random but have a certain dependency length r. 
The parameter r represents the maximum length a node in one network connects to its dependent 
node in another network. Here, for the sake simplicity and without loss of generality, we generate 
the network similarly to Ref.[14], as follows: model dependencies between spatially embedded 
networks by two square lattices A and B of same number of nodes N = L * L with periodic 
conditions, where L is the linear size of the lattices. In lattice, each node has two types of links: 
connectivity links and dependency links. Each node is connected with its neighbors in the same 
network by connectivity links. Each node in lattice A is depend on a node in lattice B which is 
chosen at random from all nodes within a radius r via dependency links(and vise versa), That is, a 
node ai located at (xi, yi) in lattice A is coupled with one and only node bj located at (xj, yj) in 
lattice B with the condition(see Fig.1): 
|xi - xj| ≤ r and |yi - yj| ≤ r       (1) 
In this work, we used the same set of parameter r as in Ref.[24], namely r =15, and the lattice size 
was L=100 (N=10000). The value of <k> studied here was 3, based on empirical studies of power 
grids which have found a mean degree of 2.5 ≤ <k> ≤ 3[40]. The simulation results in this paper 
were generated in this manner.  
 Fig.1 The interdependent spatially embedded networks was constructed by two square lattices A 
and B with the same size where each node has two types of links: connectivity links(blue) and 
dependency links(yellow). Every node initially has up to four neighbors at most via connectivity 
links, and also, each node ai located at (xi, yi) in lattice A is coupled with one and only one node bj 
located at (xj, yj) in lattice B via dependency links, with the constraint |xi - xj| ≤ r and |yi - yj| ≤ r. 
The dependency link means that two nodes connected by it depend on each other, one of which 
failed, the other fail too. 
2.2 localized attacks 
Localized attacks model natural hazards or weapons of mass destruction which occur in 
specific areas. It is a group of failed edges concentrated in a geographical domain, resulting in 
adjacent isolated nodes. According to the Refs.[24], a local damage forming an initial hole with 
radius rh centered on a randomly node, propagate from a random location to the entire network. 
Here, following the way introduced in this reference: First, we initiate the localized attacks 
process by randomly chosen a node in lattice A as a root. Next, we remove all nodes and their 
edges within a distance rh from the root in the lattice. Thus, this triggers a cascade in which the 
nodes that depend on the removed nodes fail, triggering further losses as more nodes apart from 
giant component, and triggers further damage due to the dependencies between networks. This 
process is repeated until no more nodes fail. In the model, as in percolation theory[40], only nodes 
in the giant component (GC) of the lattice are still functioning. 
3. Healing model 
The healing model assumes a process of healing that is immediately applied at the first stage 
of the cascading failures to avoiding or delaying the collapse of the interdependent networks[32]. 
The reason behind this model is based on the fact that (a) failures propagate rapidly in networks, 
damaged devices can not be timely replaced by new one and (b) in many real infrastructure 
networks it is reasonable to reinforce adjacent nodes of failed nodes. The rules of the model is as 
follows: After the initial attacks occurs in network A, the coupled nodes of the failed nodes are 
removed from the network B through the dependent links, as the conventional process of 
cascading failures introduced in Ref.[2], but before spreading the failures back to network A the 
healing step intervenes at that time. The traditional healing step means all pairs of neighbors of 
each failed node is randomly considers as a candidate for a new connectivity link, with the 
number of add links given by the ratio of healing after having selected the candidates, all new 
connectivity links are established simultaneously. Due to the dependence of embedded spatial 
systems, further failures might propagate back and forth within the system, and always intervened 
by the healing step. Notice, random healing may change the topology considerably, bridging 
distances over time. In this paper, we denote by n=0,1,…the time steps of the cascading process, 
and the procedure for any stage n are given by (see Fig.2): 
 Stage n in A: 
(1) Nodes in lattice A become inactive if they lose dependent nodes in lattice B at state n – 1. 
(2) The remaining nodes in lattice A fail if they do not belong to the GCA via connectivity links. 
 Healing stage in A: 
(3) Randomly select a pair of remaining neighbors of a failed node in GCA, and build a 
connectivity link between them. Self-loop and parallel links are not allowed. This procedure 
is repeated until the demanded number of new links given by ratio of healing  
 Stage n in B: 
(4) Nodes in lattice B fail if they lose dependent nodes due to the cascade of failures at state n. 
(5) The remaining nodes are alive in lattice B if they belong to the GCB via connectivity links. 
 Healing stage in B: 
(6) Randomly select a pair of remaining neighbors of a failed node in GCB to establish a 
connectivity link. Self-loop and parallel links are not allowed. This procedure is repeated 
until the demanded number of new links given by ratio . 
This procedure is repeated until a steady state is reached, then we are left with the mutual 
giant component. Note that in our model a steady state is reached when the system is still 
functioning and no more nodes fail, or fully collapsed and that there is no intermediate state. 
 
Fig.2 Schematic healing model on interdependent spatially embedded networks. 
4. The strategy 
In recent study[24], the authors examined the localization of dependency generates a 
cascading phenomenon which amplifies the local attacks and leads to whole system collapse. 
When a hole of radius rh is removed from the network, the nodes that depended on them must be 
failed within a distance r via dependency links. Then, the secondary damage is highly 
concentrated around the edge of the hole via connectivity links, leading to the creation of a failure 
front which propagates outwards, step by step. So, the amount of failure caused per node removed 
is substantially higher when the failure is localized as compared with random. Based on Section 3, 
it is quite obvious that the most straightforward healing strategy is random, where two remaining 
neighbors of fail node are establishing a new link randomly. However, by doing this there is no 
guarantee that this order of adding links leads to the optimum effect when all the possible 
sequence of adding links are combined. It may happen that some links which lead to optimal 
healing have to be established first. Furthermore, random healing might change the lattice 
structures because it does not consider the distance between two nodes for a new link. In fact, the 
low degree nodes around the edge of the hole has more damage on the cascading failures, because 
these nodes are more easily apart from the giant component, failed node can disable corresponding 
dependent node in other network, and maintain failures propagating[42]. On the other hand, the 
higher the degree of node, the lower the probability of fail in next time step. Thus, our approach, 
namely healing strategy by prioritizing minimum degree(HPMD), is reasonable to establish a new 
connectivity link between remaining neighbors with minimum degree of fail nodes, that is 
enhancing the connectivity of low degree neighbors and reducing the risk of coupling effect, in 
order such that the network regains the largest network functionality in each time step. HPMD is 
quite different from previous approaches usually take the node of high degree as critical 
node[26-29], and limit the distance between two neighbors of fail node to make sure the 
connectivity links remain local, conserving the ordered lattice topology. The procedure of this 
approach is taken after every healing stage in network as follows(see Fig.3): 
(1) In healing stage, the set Fn is an union of all failed nodes within sub-network. 
(2) Let Ln be the union of all pairs (vi, vj) of remaining neighbors of nodes in Fn, self-loop and 
parallel links are not allowed. Then, we calculate the healing priority for each pairs (vi, vj) 
during the healing stage. The healing priority index H(vi, vj) of node vi and vj is defined as 
,  
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where ei,j∈Vicinity denotes the link between node vi and vj whose shortest paths are no more than 
2 in original network, that is all new links were established within a max distance=2. The kc(v) 
denotes the number of remaining connectivity links connected to node v in network. 
(3) We sort all pairs in the Ln by healing priority index H in ascending order, if some pairs have the 
same H, randomly sort them.  
(4) Next, we build a queue Q = {H1, H2, H3…}. Get node vi and vj in a pair from the head of the 
queue, connect node vi to node vj by connectivity link, and repeat this step until the demanded 
number of new links given by the ratio of healing If the queue is empty, jump to Step 5. 
(5) End. 
 
Fig.3 Schematic illustration of the HPMD: (a)Failure node F that all connections within the GC 
are removed, and represented by red dot at the end of the arrow, affects its functioning 
neighbors(va,vb,vc,vd) via connectivity links(blue). (b)In random healing, two remaining neighbors 
of the fail node F were randomly selected to establish a new connectivity link. (c)According to the 
HPMD, by counting the number of connectivity links of remaining nodes va and vc (kc(va)= 
kc(vc)=2) of the fail node F, and their distance is equal to 2 in original network, after calculating 
the healing priority index H(va, vc)=4, then two remaining neighbors va and vc preferentially 
establish a new connectivity link(red) to healing the network. 
Through computational complexity analysis, HPMD take on the worst-case run times that go 
as O(N*lg(N)). Many criteria based on the complex networks theory have been presented for 
evaluating the importance of nodes[28]. In this study, we mainly adopt three well-known criteria 
to measure the priority of link addition for a pair of two remaining neighbors in the healing stage: 
random(RH), degree(HPD) and local(HPL). In random centrality, this is the simplest strategy 
where a pair of neighbors of fail node is picked randomly for the healing candidate in each healing 
stage. In degree centrality, the candidate is highly related to its degree, and it is computed as Ref. 
[42]. In local centrality, the candidate is determined by its nearest and next nearest neighbors, and 
it is evaluated as Ref. [44].  
5. Results 
To compare the performance of our proposed strategy over healing mechanism, we present 
experimental results of different strategies including RH, HPD and HPL, on choosing candidates 
to add new links in interdependent spatially embedded networks(simulated networks for short) 
within localized attacks. Details about networks construction and localized attacks model are 
described in Section 2. All experimental results are obtained by average over 10000 independent 
trials for each ratio of healing  and attack size rh. 
For different ratio of healing , the robustness of simulated networks under localized attacks 
with different healing strategies is shown in Fig.4. Here, we use rh as initial attack size from 
network A, and S as the size of the mutual giant component at the end of the cascading 
failures[14,32]. The higher mutual giant component S would indicate the better performance of 
healing, and this figures show the differences for different rh and The pink cross-shaped 
labeled as None in figures show the result without healing design. It is obviously that, the 
efficiency of healing mechnism are much better than that of without healing after localized attack, 
and we can ensure that healing mechnism indeed decrease those nodes suffering failure from 
localized attacks and improve the resilience of simulated network. Then, we compare our strategy 
with three others to select pairs at healing stage for 3%(a), 5%(b) and 10%(c), it can be 
seen that their order of S are HPMD > RH > HPD > HPL, whatever ratio . For example, SHPMD is 
on average (0.47) higher than SRH (0.41), SHPD (0.34), and SHPL (0.31), when = 5%. It is 
interesting that RH obtains higher S than HPD. Because higher degree nodes have a relatively 
lower probability to apart from giant component during the cascading failure, so healing based on 
degree cannot suppress the process of cascading, which can fail the whole network. On the other 
hand, lower degree nodes have a higher risk to apart from network, and if one control the lower 
degree neighbors which coupled with those nodes with average degree of interdependent failure, 
then cascading failure reduced by localized attack would eliminate a lot, which means it is wise to 
select remaining neighbors based on this idea to establishing a new link firstly. The results indicate 
that HPMD is, in general, more effective to against localized attacks, and it will delay the 
appearance of collapse behavior as the attack size grows. 
 
Fig.4 The size of mutual giant connected S as a function of attack size rh with r=15. 
Whether a healing strategy is effective in controlling the cascading failures is closely related 
to its effectiveness in breaking up the network after adding a certain number of new links. Let P∞
[2], with HPMD, RH, HPD and HPLD, be the probability of existence of the mutual giant 
component by using healing strategies. The higher P∞, the more resilience. In the simulations, for 
a fixed value of rh, we consider the system remain function(that means existence of mutual giant 
component) after localized attacks if S is more than 0.001 of the realizations and nonfunction(that 
means collapsed) if S is less than 0.001. Fig.5 shows the results of P∞ for simulated networks 
with different rh, almost all the cases show a similar trend as a function of attack size rh in the  
 
Fig.5 The probability of existence of the mutual giant component P∞ as a function of attack size 
rh with r=15. 
size of mutual giant component S in Fig.4. In short, it can be seen that P∞HPMD is higher than that 
of P∞RH, P∞HPD and P∞HPL, and work better than three others in the same condition. For 
instance, as pictured in the Fig.5(b), even only 5% pairs have reconnected by HPMD, it would get 
almost average 33% of enhancement on P∞ compared to no healing mechanism, and average 
7%(16% and 22%) of enhancement on P ∞  to RH(HPD and HPL). In comparison, 
degree-based(HPD) and local-based healing strategies(HPL) have similar result and both perform 
worst. From Fig.5(a) and Fig.5(c), we note that HPMD is still a better strategy for different ratio 
has falling slowly show its more advantage. In Fig.4 and Fig.5, both indicate that HPMD is 
outperforms in a large range of rh, that is our strategy can reconstitute on giant component among 
the surviving nodes, and is more effective to against localized attacks in simulated networks.  
It is an another measure to compare effectiveness of healing strategies, is to observer the 
number of iteration steps(NOI) in the cascading process, as shown in Fig.6. The NOI is the 
number of iterative steps needed to reach the steady state which indicates the time scale of the 
process. It is known that in a conventional cascade of failures without any strategy applied the 
NOI presents a sharp and peak at the critical threshold[30]. This means that the network requires a 
long period of time to reach the steady state. Different strategies of healing affects the duration of 
cascading failures, a good healing strategy is therefore expected to have a low peak of NOI. Fig.6 
shows that the peak of NOI is obvious lower for HPMD, as compared with RH, HPD and HPL. 
For example, in Fig.6(b), the NOIpeak(HPMD)=17.63 is lower than NOIpeak(RH)=18.78, 
NOIpeak(HPD)=20.33, NOIpeak(HPL)=21.66 and NOIpeak(None)=22.63, when =5%. From these 
figure, we can make two observations, (i) that the number of steps enhances as rh increases until 
to reach the steady state, and (ii) that the NOI with HPMD does present a lower peak and steps. 
The first observation means that as the initial attack size rh becomes larger the system requires 
more NOI to reach the steady state, the second indicates that the required time steps for 
controlling the failures by HPMD is less at the same condition and show our strategy is more 
timely. 
 
Fig.6 The number of iteration steps(NOI) in the steady state as a function of attack size rh with 
r=15. 
According to Ref.[24], depending on two parameters average degree and length of 
dependency links, the critical attack size rhc needed for a hole to lead to the collapse of the entire 
system may be either rhc = 0(unstable), rhc =∞(stable) or rhc =finite (metastable). In stable phase, 
no matter how large rh is (as long as it is finite) the damage will remain localized and the system 
will stay intact. In unstable phase, the system spontaneously collapses even with rh=0 (no 
localized attack). But, in metastable phase only attacks with radius rh>rhc, it will trigger a cascade 
which destroys the entire system. If a system suffers a localized attack, what is the difference of 
rhc by different healing strategies that break up the networks? The effectiveness of HPMD is 
further illustrated in Fig.7, which compares the critical attack size rhc for different healing. Let rhc, 
larger means more robustness, be the minimum radius of localized attacks needed to cause the 
system to collapse. Obviously, we can see that rhc increases when increases, the networks 
become more resilience. The rhc values used by HPMD is always greater than three others, and is 
significantly more effective. For instance, when =5% in the Fig.7, the rhc(HPMD)=39.54 higher 
than rhc(RH)=38.88, rhc (HPD)=37.93 and rhc(HPL)=37.71. Clearly, within a small certain limit 
ratio of healing, HPMD is the first choice to determine which pairs of remaining neighbors of 
failed node that would have add a new link firstly. 
 
Fig.7 The critical attack size rhc as a function of healing probability  with r=15. 
A more efficient healing strategy is one that need fewer new links before network reach the 
steady state. For each realization of localized attacks with healing, we calculated how many new 
links were introduced in simulated network until the steady state is reached, resulting to <Eh>. 
Here, let <Eh> be the average number of new connectivity links during the healing process until to 
reaching the steady state. Fig.8 gives <Eh> as a function of attack size rh with different . From 
this figure, it is clearly that HPMD adding a relatively fewer new links will obtain a significant 
enhancement of simulated network while with a tiny cost incrementation. In the same conditions, 
we can observe that HPD and HPL will have a high cost though they can also improve the 
resilience of network. For example, <Eh>HPMD is on average (146.38) fewer than <Eh>RH (164.15), 
<Eh>HPD (186.87) and <Eh>HPL (195.95), when =5%. From Fig.8(a) and Fig.8(c), HPMD is still 
have better performance for <Eh> values have increasing slowly show its costless. It is a result of 
the addition new links between remaining functional neighbors with minimum degree of failed 
node by HPMD, then the healing stage require smaller number of new links to reorganize the 
remaining nodes. The result further confirms that HPMD can greatly enhance the resilience in a 
reasonable cost. 
 
Fig.8 The average number of established new connectivity links during the healing process <Eh> 
as a function of attack size rh with r=15. 
It is confirmed that the weakness of healing strategy without consider the distance between 
nodes, of course, may change the topology considerably, bridging longer distance as the time goes 
on[32]. Here, the long range connectivity links refers to the link between two nodes whose 
shortest paths are more than 2 in original network. In reality, two nodes which were far away try to 
establishing a new link in spatial network, neither rarely practical, nor efficient. In order to further 
analyze the structural integrity of network by HPMD, Table.1 shows the proportion of long range 
connectivity links by healing strategies until reach to steady state with  =5%. Let d be the 
shortest paths between two nodes in original network. Then, we calculate the distance proportion 
P(d) of the connectivity links between two nodes in network with rh constant. For example, P(d=1) 
refers to the proportion of the links between two nodes in remain networks, those shortest path is 
equal to one in original network. The average ofP(d) is defined as 
( ) ( )
rh
P d P d       (3) 
where rh∈[20,36] and delta is 1. In Table.1, whenP(d=1), it can be obviously seen that their 
order ofP(d=1) are HPMD > RH > HPD > HPL. In contrast, whenP(d=2), the order has been 
reversed, HPMD < RH < HPD < HPL. It is note worthy that the average distance proportion of the 
links between distant nodes,P(d=3) orP(d=4), is equal to zero by HPMD, compared with three 
others. The reason for this table is simply, because HPMD aims at adding the link only between 
adjacent remaining neighbors of failed node at each healing step, in the sense that the changing of 
network structure is minimum. So, the giant component at the end of the cascading process is still 
lattice structure by HPMD. In general, our proposed strategy can maximum to avoid change the 
network topology through establishing a new link between adjacent neighbors of failed node, and 
be more applicability. 
 P(d=1) P(d=2) P(d=3) P(d=4) 
HPMD 99.46% 0.54% 0 0 
RH 99.29% 0.69% 0.01% 0.01% 
HPD 99.05% 0.88% 0.05% 0.02% 
HPL 98.47% 1.39% 0.12% 0.02% 
Table 1. Comparisons of the average distance proportion of the connectivity links between nodes 
in the steady state of the mutual giant component by =5% and r=15, when rh∈[20,36]. 
6. Discussion 
Indeed, from all figures and table in Section 5, both illustrates that HPMD is the most 
effective and costless healing strategy to improving the resilient of interdependent spatially 
embedded networks against localized attacks. The reasons why our proposed method can reinforce 
the resilience of the networks are as follows. Firstly, lower degree nodes are more easily apart 
from giant component, then coupled node in other network would be failed too. Fig.9 is shown as 
the probability of failure with different degree vary in time steps under localized attacks, without 
any healing. Except for first step, the probability of failure of degree k=1 is on average (48.21%) 
higher than k=2(33.89%), k=3(15.05%) and k=4(3%), when rh=32. It is obvious that, node who 
less connectivity are more likely to apart from current giant component for each step. Secondly, 
the coupling in networks will leads to one interdependency link between a low degree node and 
another node with average degree, thus magnifying the impact of low degree nodes. This is 
completely difference in a single network, the failures of lower degree nodes not have a great 
impact on network because the weakness of connectivity. HPMD aims at adding the link between 
two remaining neighbors with lower degree of failed node at each healing step, in the sense that 
the increase of network functionality is maximum at each step. 
 Fig.9 The probability of failure with different degree in network A, as a function of the finite time 
steps during the cascading process with rh=32. 
There is no doubt that the performance of healing strategy depend on network structures. To 
show the influences of the spatial constraints on healing, we have performed experiments about 
the critical attack size rhc as a function of length of dependency links r in simulated networks, as 
shown in Fig.10. Even the length of dependency links r is variable, we can see that the rhc value 
of HPMD is higher than three others although they may generate not worse healing results. Clearly, 
HPMD performs well when the spatial lengths of simulated networks are modified. Furthermore, 
from the Fig.10, we can make three observations: (i) for a small spatial lengths(e.g. r≤10), the 
nodes can only couple their adjacent nodes, in these cases, a localized attacks outbreak is mostly 
restricted in a local area and a larger attack size is required to initiate a cascade. For instance, the 
rhc values of healing strategies both peaked at r=10, rhc(HPMD)=43.39, rhc(RH)=43.25, 
rhc(HPD)=43.06 and rhc(HPL)=42.94; (ii) for an intermediate spatial length, the failure could not 
only propagate far away, but also lead to a large enough density of failed nodes, thus the network 
becomes most vulnerable such as rhc reache to the lowest when r=30, rhc(HPMD)=34.79, 
rhc(RH)=34.01, rhc(HPD)=33.32 and rhc(HPL)=33.05. But even so, HPMD is still maintains 
dominance over the spatial length; (iii) for a large spatial lengths(e.g. r=L)that a given node’s 
dependency link can be located farther away, failure can also propagate far away, but the density 
of failed nodes is too sparse to trigger a cascading process. For example, the rhc values both have 
a relatively higher at r=100, rhc(HPMD)=38.52, rhc(RH)=38.07, rhc(HPD)=37.46 and 
rhc(HPL)=37.11. In general, if r→∞ or r→0, the avalanche would not happen because the 
secondary damage would spread everywhere uniformly or remain in local place, respectively. To 
be sure, HPMD is a better healing strategy and more suitable to against localized attacks on 
interdependent spatially embedded networks.  
 
Fig.10 The critical attack size rhc as a function of the length of dependency links r with =5%. 
7. Conclusions 
Robustness of interdependent spatially embedded networks under cascading failure has 
become hot topic in recent years. Compared with random failures, more serious problem was the 
damage reduced by localized attacks could make a whole network collapse only need a tiny attack 
size. A dynamic healing strategy was proposed to determining the consequences of healing by link 
formation in interdependent networks under random failure. By establishing new random links in 
remaining neighbors of the failed nodes, the healing strategy delayed the collapse of network 
through the enhancing of connectivity. However, random healing is too simple, and do not take 
into account the propagation process of localized attacks in interdependent spatially embedded 
networks. In this paper, we have analyzed the healing process and localized attacks model, namely 
the low degree nodes are more easily failed, thus corresponding coupled nodes with average 
degree would be also disconnected, and maintain failures propagating. Therefore, the remaining 
functional neighbors with lower degree of failed nodes urgently need healing, and should consider 
distance between nodes in a new link to avoid changing the network structure. Then, by analyzing 
these factors, a new healing method HPMD(healing strategy by prioritizing minimum degree) is 
proposed. In Section 5, to verify the effect of our proposed healing strategy on the optimization of 
the resilience of the network, we conduct a series of comparative experiments compared with 
three others (RH, HPD and HPL are conducted in Section 4). It illustrates that HPMD remarkably 
outperforms others with more efficiency and costless, timely and more applicability. Our 
experiments also demonstrate that interdependent spatially embedded networks with healing 
mechanism are more robust to localized attacks than those without healing design. 
Our strategy can aid in the development of intervention strategies for crisis situations. 
Meanwhile, the research of this paper is helpful to provide guidance on how to build robust 
interdependent spatially embedded networks against the potential localized attacks. 
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